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Over the last two and a half centuries, fertility has
fallen dramatically throughout Europe (Mitchell
2003). In relative terms, the fall has been more pro-
nounced since the end of World War II.After a mod-
est recovery in the 1960s (the so-called baby boom),
the total fertility rate (TFR) declined for almost two
decades before settling below the replacement level
of 2.1 births per woman.
If we plot the TFR against the share of pension or,
more generally,social expenditure in GDP,we detect
a negative correlation (see Figure 1). Why? The
usual explanation is that, since the state has taken
over from the family as the main source of old-age
support, any increase in the old-age dependency
ratio translates into higher public expenditure on
pensions,health and social facilities for the aged peo-
ple.The effect of falling fertility has been exacerbat-
ed by the fact that life expectancy has risen, but the
statutory age of retirement has not been allowed to
keep pace with the age at which people actually
become old.
The combined effect of fewer births,longer lives and
sluggish retirement age is putting public pension
systems,all essentially pay-as-you-go,under increas-
ing strain. Most governments are responding to this
by either raising contributions or cutting benefits
(by a variety of means, including later retirement).
Those who have gone for benefit cuts are introduc-
ing tax inducements to buy into private pension
schemes.Some have also introduced or are about to
introduce fertility incentives.Others still are making
it easier to combine work with parenthood by
improving child-care facilities, introducing flexible
working hours, etc.
What does not seem to have occurred to anyone in
government, or in a position to influence public
opinion, is that 
– public pensions themselves are in part to blame
for the fertility decline, and
– cutting pensions would not increase voluntary
saving.
I shall try to throw light on these issues, drawing on
Cigno and Werding (2007).
What do we know about the
effects of pension policy?
The effect of pension policy on
voluntary saving has long been
the object of empirical re-
search. A majority of the stud-
ies based on individual or
household data finds that pen-
sions will either discourage or
have no statistically significant
effect on household saving.
Others find a positive effect.All
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Figure 1ture,hence fertility,as given.Fertility is assumed to
be exogenous also in early studies of aggregate
data, and the findings are equally contradictory.
The effect on fertility has received less attention.A
number of cross-country studies find that pensions
discourage fertility.
More recent investigations allowing for saving and
fertility to be jointly determined invariably find that
pensions have a negative effect on fertility,but either
a positive effect,or no effect at all,on household sav-
ing.1 Contrary to what appears to be the assumption
behind current policies,it would thus seem that pub-
lic pensions displace fertility, and human capital
investment,rather than voluntary saving.This makes
public pension systems,all essentially pay-as-you-go,
intrinsically unstable. The system eats away at its
own contributive basis.
There are various ways in which one can explain this
phenomenon.The one I favour goes as follows.Most
people derive pleasure from having children and
from seeing them as well.But children are very cost-
ly in terms of actual expenditure and forgone earn-
ings. If pension entitlements increase with earnings,
there is a further cost in terms of forgone pension
benefits. Fertility will consequently be higher if, in
addition to altruistic pleasure, children bring tangi-
ble rewards – in other words, if bringing a person
into the world is a good investment, as well as an act
of love. Explanations of reproduction and transfer
behaviour based entirely on the latter do not appear
to fit the facts.2
In developing countries where young children can be
made to work, part of the reward for having a child
may come rather early, in the form of the child’s net
contribution to family income. In developed coun-
tries,young children do not usually make any contri-
bution to family income. But most grown-up chil-
dren provide their elderly parents with personal ser-
vices, and a few also with material support. Since, in
developed countries, the old are relatively well pro-
vided with money through either personal saving or
the pension system, and given that the market does
not provide perfect substitutes for the services of
their own children,the money-equivalent of the util-
ity that they derive from such services (i.e., the
amount of money that they would be willing to pay
for them) is likely to be even higher than in devel-
oping countries.
The problem with the idea that money and time
spent on a young child might return in the form of
old-age support is that parents cannot oblige a
grown-up child to do or give anything. Both the eco-
nomic and the sociological literature abound with
arguments to the effect that a child can be brought
up to feel it is his moral duty to support his parents
in old age, or otherwise that an adult will meet with
society’s disapproval if he does not support his elder-
ly parents. My own argument, not incompatible with
those mentioned, is based on the family-level equiv-
alent of a political constitution.A family constitution
(unwritten, and typically also unspoken) is a set of
rules specifying the minimum that an adult must
give, or do for his elderly parents, and each of his
young children, so designed that it is in every family
member’s interest to obey it, and in no generation’s
interest to amend it.
The introduction of a public pension scheme
makes a number of these constitutions unviable.3
For a number of adults, the investment motive for
having children, and for investing money and time
in their upbringing, will then disappear.These per-
sons will have fewer children than they would have
had without the scheme. Indeed, if the scheme is
pay-as-you-go,they will have fewer children than is
efficient.An extra birth would in fact make all par-
ticipants in the scheme collectively better-off.4
Given a large number of participants, however, the
benefit to the child’s own parents will be too small
to matter, and will thus be disregarded in taking
fertility decisions.
The effect on voluntary saving is ambiguous. On the
one hand, compulsory saving in the form of pension
contributions tends to substitute for voluntary sav-
ing. On the other, however, those who, without the
policy, would have saved very little or not at all, may
now find that the pension does not fully compensate
them for the loss of filial support, and will then save
more. The household saving rate may thus rise or
fall. As already mentioned, there is evidence that it
would either rise or stay the same.
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1 See Cigno and Rosati (1992); Cigno and Rosati (1996); Ehrlich
and Zhong (1998); Cigno et al. (2003a); and Zhang and Zhang
(2004).Those investigation in which I am involved are single-coun-
try,time-series studies.The other two are cross-country studies,and
estimate also the effect of pensions on growth. But one finds this
effect to be negative, the other to be positive.
2 See Cigno et al. (2003a and 2006), and references therein.
3 The demonstration is in Cigno (2006). Evidence that a statistical-
ly significant fraction of the population is constrained by it is
reported in Cigno et al. (2006).
4 For Germany,Werding and Hofmann (2005) put the average pre-
sent value of the net benefits accruing to the pension fund as a
result of the birth of a child at about  139,000.CESifo Forum 3/2007 39
Is there anything a government can do?
One thing a government can do,if it wants to get rid
of the undesirable effects of a public pension sys-
tem, is get rid of the system (or cut it back drasti-
cally, leaving in place only a low safety net). That
would restore the incentive to have children, and
invest in them. But it would also reduce the incen-
tive to save. Could this be countered by tax induce-
ments to buy into private pension plans? Since the
tax advantages induce a substitution of pension
plans for other forms of voluntary saving, there will
be an overall increase only if the substitution effect
is dominated by the income effect. But the latter
will in any case be compensated away if the gov-
ernment raises the income tax rate to recover lost
revenue.
An alternative to cutting the public pension sys-
tem, or cutting it too drastically, is to subsidize fer-
tility. Cash benefits and tax allowances for families
with children are present almost universally.
Fertility-related benefits are present in some pen-
sion systems. Examples of this are the majoration
de durée d’assurance pour enfants in the French
Régime Général, and the Swedish extrapension för
barn. In 1986, the German government started
crediting parents who withdraw from the labour
market to look after a child with a notional pension
contribution, Kindererziehungszeiten, originally set
at 75 percent of average earnings, for up to one
year.Later,this notional contribution was raised to
100 percent of average earnings, and extended to
three years.Since 1996,however,the condition that
the parent should actually give up work in order to
qualify for the benefit has been removed, and
Kindererziehungszeiten has become a fertility-
related pension benefit just like the French and
Swedish ones.
The only difference between child benefits as com-
monly understood,and fertility-related pension ben-
efits,is that the former are paid much earlier,and are
less uncertain, than the latter. Given imperfect cred-
it and insurance markets, one euro in the form of
conventional child benefits is thus likely to elicit a
stronger fertility response than the promise of a fer-
tility-related pension benefit with a present value of
one euro.Irrespective of when they are paid,howev-
er, fertility-related benefits induce parents to substi-
tute quantity for quality – in other words, to have
more children,and spend less money or time on each
of them.5 This may be countered using education
subsidies. Since both kinds of subsidy cost tax-
payer’s money, however, using them together is an
expensive way to foster fertility and human capital
formation.
A more cost-effective policy is to introduce pension
benefits contingent on the total earning capacity of
the pensioner’s own children (Cigno et al., 2003b).
An element of that was present in Kindererzie-
hungszeiten until the requirement that a parent
should give up work to qualify for the benefit was
removed. The length of time that a parent stays out
of the labour market following the birth of a child is,
in fact, a measure (albeit a very crude one) of the
amount of time that the parent spends with the child.
Conditioning pension benefits on this, however,
rewards only one of the inputs into the making of a
successful citizen, and will consequently distort
parental choice.Furthermre,it does not take account
of the quality of parental attention.
Policy proposals and simulations of their impacts
My proposal is to set up two parallel pension
schemes, each one designed to break even over the
long run:
1. A conventional Bismarck-type scheme, where
individual benefits depend on individual contri-
butions, with some adjustment for equity and
insurance purposes.
2. A scheme offering benefits conditional on the
earning potential of the pensioner’s own chil-
dren,6 again with adjustments for equity7 and
insurance.
Unlike a conventional pay-as-you-go scheme
(where there is no connection between the amount
a pensioner takes out, and the amount his children
put in the common pool), the scheme 2 contains an
incentive to maximise the collective earning capaci-
ty of one’s own offspring. Couples and individuals
should be free to combine the schemes 1 and 2 in a
way they like, and thus to allocate their time
between earning money and producing future earn-
ing capacity in accordance with their comparative
advantages.
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5 The point appears to have been made for the first time in Cigno
(1986).
6 Potential rather than actual because the children, too, may want
to withdraw from the labour market for a period to raise children.
7 A redistributive element is desirable not only for the usual rea-
sons, but also to stop parents pushing their children into the more
lucrative occupations irrespective of personal inclination.To illustrate the effects of this proposal, and com-
pare them with those of alternative policies, I will
now report some of the simulations in Cigno and
Werding (2007). These were carried out using the
econometric model of West Germany in Cigno et al.
(2003a). The latter was estimated using aggregate
data relating to the 1960-95 period, the longest for
which the relevant information is available for West
Germany separately from the rest of the country.
The model allows for possible cross-links between
saving and fertility and for the increase in the effec-
tiveness of birth control that followed the introduc-
tion of the contraceptive pill in the late 1960s.8
As elsewhere in Western Europe, fertility in West
Germany fell sharply after the baby boom from
about 2.5 in 1965 to about 1.35 in 1975, and then
oscillated around this low level. Figure 2 shows what
happened to the TFR over the last decade and a half
of the estimation period. For the subsequent years
until 2020, it shows what would have happened
under alternative policy scenarios. The latter differ
with regard to the evolution of pension coverage, of
the forced intergenerational transfers implied by a
pension fund deficit or surplus, and of the child ben-
efit rate.
Pension coverage is measured by the ratio of pen-
sion payments,at constant prices,to the number of
persons aged 65 (the statutory age of retirement)
or over. Variations in this ratio reflect changes in
longevity, in the effective age of retirement, in the
monetary amount of the benefit in the first year
after retirement, and in the method used to uprate
this benefit in subsequent years. The forced inter-
generational transfer is measured by the differ-
ence between pension payments and pension con-
tributions, expressed as a percentage of the latter.9
The child benefit rate includes all fertility-related
cash payments and tax allowances, again at con-
stant prices.The alternative policy scenarios are as
follows.
S1 Pension coverage grows, on average, at the
same rate (2 percent a year) as over the estimation
period.The forced intergenerational transfer and the
child benefit rate are held constant at their 1995
level.
S6 Pension coverage declines on average by
2 percent a year.The forced intergenerational trans-
fer is held constant. The child benefit rate increases
by 1.2 percent a year from its 1995 level.
APS Pension coverage is the actual one until
2001, the one implied by the 2001 pension reform
from then on. The forced intergenerational transfer
is held constant. The child benefit rate increases by
1.2 percent a year from its 1995 level.
FRP Pension coverage falls faster than in either
S6 or APS.This is achieved by making it more diffi-
cult to retire before the statutory age,10 and by index-
ing pension benefits to consumer prices instead of
wages minus pension contributions as is current
practice.11 The forced intergenerational transfer is
held constant. The child benefit rate increases by
1.2 percent a year. The clause that a parent should
actually withdraw from the labour market in order
to qualify for Kindererziehungszeiten is reintro-
duced, but the maximum number of years for which
the parent can be credited with this notional pension
contribution is increased from 3 to 18.
CFP Pension coverage is reduced, and the child
benefit rate increased as in FRP.The pension ben-
efits paid under the Kindererziehungszeiten
scheme are related to the earning capacity of the
pensioner’s own children, rather than to average
earnings in the pensioner’s own contemporaries as
in  FRP. The deficit of the pension fund current
account is transformed from a collective benefit for
all current pensioners into an individual benefit for
the pensioner whose children are currently paying
taxes and pension contributions,and it is thus made
endogenous.
S1 is a continuation of the 1960–95 policies.Figure 2
shows that this would have resulted in a continua-
tion of the downward fertility trend experienced in
the last two and a half decades.S6 hypothesizes that
the government relies exclusively on lower pension
benefits, and higher child benefits, to induce people
to have more children. This would have caused a
sharp inversion of tendency that would have
brought the TFR back up to its 1972 level by 2020.
APS describes what was actually done until 2001,
and what will be, or would have been, done from
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8 Consistently with the hypothesis that reproduction is a voluntary
act, the study finds that this improvement in birth control technol-
ogy has made fertility more responsive to the policy variables.
9 In the long run, a deficit or surplus in the pension fund current
account tends to translate into a surplus or deficit in the genera-
tional account.
10 As a result, the average age of retirement rises to 65 by the year
2010.
11This indexation method,introduced in Germany in the year 2000
and later abandoned, is less favourable than the one actually in
force because it does not take account of real wage growth.CESifo Forum 3/2007 41
then on if the political decisions taken in that year
are or were put into practice. This would have
brought about a more modest recovery than S6.
FRP hypothesizes more radical pension reform than
APS. In particular, it re-introduces the incentive for
parents to spend time with their children. This
would have led to a recovery of TFR more robust
than in APS, but still less robust than in S6. CFP
approximates my own proposal,and would have led
to faster fertility recovery than FRP. In this sce-
nario, the TFR would have reached the same level
as in the S6 scenario by about 2005.
The policies under consideration affect not only fer-
tility, but also voluntary saving. Presumably, they
affect human capital investment too, but we do not
have estimates of that. S1 would have driven house-
hold saving up sharply from its 1995 level. APS and
FRP would have led to a more moderate increase.S6
and  CFP would have reduced saving slightly.
Although the model is silent on the subject, and evi-
dence from other sources is contradictory,12 produc-
tivity can be expected to grow faster in S1, which
entails an increasing capital-labour ratio, and CFP,
which entails a modest decline of that ratio, but an
increase in human capital investment, than in any of
the other scenarios, all of which imply a rapidly
decreasing capital-labour ratio,and less human capi-
tal investment. Unlike S1, however, CFP would not
pay for this increase in human capital investment
with a reduction in fertility.
It may thus be possible to reform
a pension system so that the
incentive for couples and indi-
viduals to have children, and
invest in their future earning
capacity, is restored. As well as
resolving the financial problems
of the system itself, this would
make the economy at large more
efficient.
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12 As already mentioned, Ehrlich and Zhong (1998) estimate that
cutting pensions would raise productivity growth, while Zhang
and Zhang (2004) demonstrate that such a policy action would
reduce it.London, were personalities from politics and busi-
ness.
Regina Stachelhaus, Managing Director of Hewlett-
Packard GmbH, Böblingen, highlighted that acade-
mically qualified women are disproportionately
involved in the drop in the birth-rate. Firstly, they
delay child-bearing and then either have only one
child or remain childless.They are not motivated by
a selfish attitude but truly fear the feasibility of suc-
cessfully managing a demanding job and parenting.
In addition they often doubt whether they would
have enough support from their (1) partner, (2)
employer and colleagues, and (3) family, friends and
the society. She called for a new public debate in
Germany regarding this matter. Apart from the
more intensive supports provided by government
initiatives as well as by employers and industry, a
change in the acceptance of working mothers by the
society appears to be required.
According to François Héran, Director of the
National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED)
in Paris, most of the process of population ageing is
due to the inexorable increase in longevity, and the
policy initiatives to increase the fertility rate will
never offset the unavoidable part of population age-
ing.They can be successful only if their objective is to
counter the avoidable part of population ageing due
to low fertility by alleviating the relevant economic
and non-economic constraints. Nevertheless, there
appears to be no scientific rationale to justify the pri-
ority of internal growth (native births) over external
growth (through immigration). In his opinion, the
decision is merely political. In practice, the natural
increase in population of the European countries
will continue to slow down, and immigration will
turn out to be the first engine of demographic
growth, even in France.
The next speaker, Kurt Biedenkopf, the former
Minister-President of Saxony and Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, Hertie School of Governance in
Dresden, argued that he is in “agreement with much
of what family policy is doing – child-care, kinder-
gartens, payments to families – to secure better
opportunities for combining work and child raising.
All these factors are of great importance”. In addi-
tion he emphasised that “we have to direct our atten-
tion towards making better use of human resources,
which gives education a top priority. The political
consequences of that are far-reaching. It is a fact, at
least in Germany, that it is immensely difficult to
expand the educational system, both in quantity and
in quality.However,if you have one third fewer chil-
dren, and they are supposed to carry the burden of
maintaining the present living standard if not con-
tribute to its growth, they have to be much better
educated than their parents. Right now the opposite
seems to be true.We have a growing group of people,
especially in the so-called lower strata of society,
who,for whatever reasons,are not really attending to
education. So we are actually wasting human
resources rather than developing them. A turn-
around in this area is indispensable for future devel-
opment. Education and life-long learning are imper-
ative”. Yet he warned of the emergence of the so-
called moral hazard problem in this policy field, say-
ing that “the more the state intervenes, the less the
population is willing and – over a longer period of
time – capable of adapting to changing conditions
without political support”.
David Willets, Member of Parliament and the
Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Skills
of the UK, pointed out that the birth rate and the
birth behaviour can be well affected by some dereg-
ulation policy measures. Apart from the implemen-
tation of flexible labour market system and working
hours, a combination of having jobs and having chil-
dren appears to get easier for women if there is less
restriction regarding the consumer market system
including shopping hours. Longer school hours and
extended school days would also have a similar
impact.According to his opinion,the delay of house-
hold formation in Italy has been, to a certain extent,
led by the highly regulated domestic financial and
banking systems accompanied by the expensive
mortgage system. Furthermore in some European
countries including Italy and Greece but also in
Japan a large number of women have been taking
care of elderly people and children within the same
household.Although it sounds paradoxical,a shift of
the obligation for elderly care to the state seems to
be an option for the pro-child family policy in these
countries.
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